Petaloop Run process 2.0.2 establishes a Principal-mediated first engagement
with the private petaloop/fabric repository from a private, unrecorded Linux
or macOS terminal.
For an ordinary read-only engagement, use the governed Stage-0 launcher
documented at https://petaloop.run/BOOTSTRAP.md. Stage 0 pins this Stage-1
file by commit, byte length, and SHA-256 and always requests READ_ONLY.
For a direct Stage-1 engagement, including any separately authorized
READ_WRITE request, run only at the Principal’s invitation. Obtain an
immutable HTTPS source URL, commit, exact byte length, and SHA-256 from the
Principal through the governed channel. Download first; never stream moving
Stage-1 network bytes directly into a shell:
umask 077
bootstrap_dir="$(/usr/bin/mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/petaloop-run.XXXXXX")"
stage1_url='<Principal-supplied-immutable-HTTPS-URL>'
/usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin \
/usr/bin/curl --disable --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 --location \
--proto-redir '=https' --fail --silent --show-error \
--output "${bootstrap_dir}/process.sh" \
"${stage1_url}"
Verify the supplied source tuple before execution. A digest served only beside the fetched script is not an independent trust root. Then use the system Bash without ambient startup files, passing those exact public provenance values back to the bootstrap:
/usr/bin/env -i HOME="${HOME}" TERM="${TERM:-dumb}" \
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin PETALOOP_CLEAN_LAUNCH=1 \
/bin/bash -n "${bootstrap_dir}/process.sh"
/usr/bin/env -i HOME="${HOME}" TERM="${TERM:-dumb}" \
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin PETALOOP_CLEAN_LAUNCH=1 /bin/bash \
"${bootstrap_dir}/process.sh" \
--source-commit <40-lowercase-hex> \
--source-length <positive-byte-count> \
--source-sha256 <64-lowercase-hex> \
--access-mode <READ_ONLY-or-READ_WRITE>
The clean launcher prevents inherited shell functions and unrelated environment configuration from shadowing security-critical commands before verification. The script rejects engagement execution without that launcher. It also requires the bootstrap directory and file to be owned, non-symlink, mode 0700/0600, and free of permissive macOS ACLs.
The script resolves its own file, recomputes its byte length and SHA-256 before network access or key creation, requires equality with the Principal-authorized values, and records both values in the local lifecycle record. The commit is Principal-supplied provenance; the byte identity is the locally enforced input.
The environment must be non-root and supply system Bash, Git, and OpenSSH 6.8 or newer. The script restricts its runtime path and ignores ambient system and global Git configuration. It rejects unsafe or symlinked engagement parents.
Before generating a credential, the process verifies GitHub’s presented Ed25519 host identity against GitHub’s published fingerprint. It repeats that check after authorization and requires the two observed host keys to agree. The verified host key is stored only in an isolated engagement trust file; user and system SSH trust stores are not modified.
The process creates an unencrypted Ed25519 key in a mode-0700 engagement directory and presents only its public half and SHA-256 fingerprint. The private key is never displayed. The exact Principal signal is bound to:
git@github.com:petaloop/fabric.git; andThe invocation requests exactly one access mode. The script displays only its matching repository-and-fingerprint-bound signal. Read-only is recommended for verification, review, and ordinary context access. Read/write is appropriate only when a separate task expressly requires repository mutation. The Principal must install the deploy key with the same permission named by the request and returned signal, or decline the request.
The permission signal grants repository capability only. It grants no task, commit, push, Git-note, release, deployment, or publication authority. The private repository supplies its own task-acquisition and authorization rules after access is established.
Successful engagement retains the key, isolated host-trust file, lifecycle record, and private working copy for later separately authorized ceremonies. The lifecycle record identifies the repository, process version, platform, Principal-attested access mode, public-key fingerprint, paths, timestamps, host fingerprint, and zero task authority. It never contains private-key bytes or the raw authorization transcript.
GitHub deploy keys do not expire automatically. The Principal governs rotation and revocation. When engagement ends or compromise is suspected, revoke the GitHub deploy key first, then remove the local engagement directory and private working copy. Local deletion is not remote revocation. Permission escalation, repository changes, rotation, or a replacement engagement require a new key and a new fingerprint-bound Principal signal.
If engagement fails, the process removes the exact credential and workspace
paths it created. If the public key may have been installed, it reports the
fingerprint that the Principal must inspect and revoke. SIGKILL, power loss,
hostile same-user races, and a compromised host or system toolchain remain
outside what a Bash cleanup trap can guarantee.
Run the static portability gate on every supported host before release:
/bin/bash tests/process-portability.sh
The gate checks Bash syntax and version output and rejects the GNU-only
chmod MODE -- PATH operand order that BSD chmod on macOS interprets as a
literal path. All chmod targets used by this process are absolute,
process-constructed paths, so omitting that misplaced separator does not admit
an option-like target.
This public repository intentionally supplies no private project context. Once authorized, the private repository may be read within the granted access mode. Repository content and Git notes can provide project rules, objectives, and task-selection procedures, but possession of the clone or credential never creates task authority. Ambiguous, missing, or conflicting private instructions require a stop and Principal resolution.